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RECENT CASES
ALIEN-PERSONS WHO MAY BECOME CITIZENS BY NATURALIZATION-
ALIEN WIFE OF FoREIGNER.-IN RE RIONDA, 164 FED. 368.-Held, an alien
woman, married to an alien, although residing in this country and other-
wise qualified, cannot become a citizen of the United States by naturaliza-
tion.
The wife of an alien becomes a citizen upon the naturalization of her
husband. People v. Newell, 38 Hum. 78. And it makes no difference whe-
ther the husband's naturalization takes place before or after the marriage.
Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 299. The political status of the wife is the
same as that of her husband. Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. 211; Comitis v.
Parkerson, 22 L. R. A. 148. But in Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617,
it was held that an alien wife may be naturalized without the concurrence
of her husband. The relation of husband and wife is not inconsistent with
one being an alien and the other a citizen. Comitis v. Parkerson, 22
L. R. A. 148.
ANIMALS-MAD DOGs-OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY.-VAN ETTEN V.
NOYES, 112 N. Y. SuFp. 888.-Held, that while the owner of domestic ani-
mals, such as cattle, is generally liable for the unwarrantable entry by his
animal upon another's land, one who owns or harbors a dog is not liable
in trespass every time it goes upon another's land, the general rule being
that the owner is not liable for harm done by his dog, unless it was of a
mischievous disposition or vicious propensity, and the owner previously
knew thereof, or was chargeable with notice that the dog was harmfully
disposed; and hence, an owner is not liable for injury inflicted by a mad
dog, where she did not know or have any reason to believe that the dog
was mad, or had a vicious nature or harmful disposition. McLennan, P. J.,
dissenting in part.
The above ruling follows the weight of authority. Dolph u. Ferris,
7 W. and S. (Pa.) 317; Van Leuven v. Lyke, I N. Y. 515. There is,
however, no absolute liability for trespasses of dogs, because their trespasses
are not usually injurious to property. Brown v. Giles, I C. & P. 118.
Contra: Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burrows 2092. To hold the owner
liable he must know of the dog's vicious propensities. Koney v. Ward,
2 Daly 295; Vrooman v. Lawyer, 13 Johns 339. Scienter is the gist of the
action. Fairchild v. Bently, 3o Barb. 147. And the fact that the injury
is the first actually inflicted by dog is not a good defense. Rider v. White,
65 N. Y. 54.
BILLS AND NOTEs-NEGOTIABLE NOTE-EXTENSION OF TIME OF PAY-
MENT.-FIRsT NATIONAL BANK OF POMEROY, IA. v. BuTTERY, 116 N. W.
341 (N. D.).-A note by its terms. was payable on or before a date
named and contained a clause, "the maker's and indorser's consent that
the time of its payment may be extended without notice," held, to be
negotiable. Morgan, C. J., dissenting.
According to the Law Merchant, a note in order to be negotiable
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-must be payable unconditionally and at some fixed period of time. Walker
v. Woolen, 54 Ind. 164. And the writers say, that if a note contains a
provision that the payee or his assigns may extend the time of payment,
its negotiability is destroyed. Daniel on Negotiable Inst. 5th Ed. p. 49.
Nearly all the courts hold that such a provision in a note destroys its
negotiability. Second National Bank v. Wheeler, 75 Mich. 546; Wood-
-bury v. Roberts, 59 Ia. 348. But contrary to the weight of authority, it
has been held in one jurisdiction, that such a provision does not destroy
the negotiability of a note. City National Bank v. Goodloe-McClelland
-Com. Co., 93 Mo. App. 123.
BILLS AND NOTES-PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT-PRESENTMENT BY
TELEPHONE.-GILPIN v. SAVAGE, 112 N. Y. Supp. 8o2.-Where a note was
made payable at the home of the maker on a certain street, and at
maturity he was called up there by telephone and asked what he was
going to do about it, and replied that he could not pay it, and was in-
formed that the note would be protested, held, that the demand over the
telephone was a sufficient presentation for payment, the statutory right of
the maker to the exhibition of the note being waived by his failure to
insist thereon.
It is well settled that the right to an actual presentment of the note
when payment is demanded is waived by failure to ask for it, and declin-
ing to pay the note on other grounds than its non-presentment. Waring v.
Betts, go Va. 46. And it has always been the rule that where a bill or note
is made payable at a particular place, it is necessary that the demand of
payment should be made at the place specified. Smith v. McLean, 4 N. C.
5og. That a demand over the telephone connected with the place specified
is a proper demand, is the subject of judicial decision for the first time in
the case at hand. But though there is no previous direct authority for this
decision, it is quite consistent with decisions in other cases in which the
courts have recognized the telephone as a business necessity. Wolfe ,.
Mo. Pac. R. Co., 97 Mo. 473; Nat. Bank v. Smith, 21 Pa. Co. Ct. I.
CARRIERS - INJURIES - PERSON ACCOMPANYING PASSENGER.- COLE's
ADMINISTRATOR V. CHESAPEAKE & 0. RY. Co., 113 S. W. (Ky.) 822.-Held,
a carrier is not liable for the death of one who falls from'a moving train
after accompanying a passenger into the car, in the absence of evidence
that its servants had either actual or constructive notice that deceased
intended to leave the train and did not intend to take passage thereon.
One who goes to a train in charge of a lady and child, is entitled to
sufficient time to enable him to escort her to a seat and to then leave the
train, and the railway company is liable for injuries sustained by him
where the employees failed to notify him to get off. Dots v. Mo. K., 59
Mo. 270. A person who boarded a train merely to assist another to a
seat, must give notice of his intention to get off in order to hold the
company liable for not giving him time to get off. Dillingham v. Pierce,
31 S. W. 203 (Tex.) ; Yarnell v. K., C., Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 52o.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.--CORRIGAN V.
KANSAS CITY, III S. W. IiS.-The charter of the city of Kansas City
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authorized the imposing of a special tax for park purposes on all the real
estate exclusive of improvements; and under such provision of the charter
an ordinance was passed which imposed a tax only on so much of the real
estate as was taxable for general city purposes; the result being the omission
of church, city and railroad properties. Held, that such ordinance did not
deny the property owners taxed thereunder the equal protection of the
law within the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Bur-
gess, Graves and Woodsen, J. J., dissenting.
This decision is apparently a departure from the doctrine laid down
by the courts of this country, that an ordinance which involves official
discretion as to whom rights and liabilities shall vest, is void, offendirig as
it does the Fourteenth Amendment. St. Louis v. Heitzberg Packing Co.,
141 Mo. 375; In re Wo Lee, 26 Fed. 471. Legislation discriminating against
some and favoring others, is prohibited. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S.
27. A law which exempts all property of like nature or condition, falling
naturally into a particular class does not necessarily offend constitutional
provisions. Pacific Express Co. v. Siebert, 142 U. S. 351. But an arbitrary
classification of property or persons for the purpose of taxation is not
permitted. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. 121.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION-FAILURE To LIST PROPERTY.-
TRAVELER'S INS. Co. v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS ET AL., 47 So. 439 (LA.).-
Held, that the state may subject to the doom of the assessors a taxpayer
who has failed to furnish a list of his property to the assessor as required
by law, but not where the failure to make such return was without
fraudulent intent and from an honest belief that what property he had
was not taxable.
Statutes requiring taxpayers to furnish a list of their taxable property
to the assessor, and subjecting them to the dbom of the assessor for a
failure or refusal to do so, have in the past been regarded as valid. Lin-
coln v. City of Worcester, 8 Cush. 55; State v. Apgar, 31 N. J. L. 358.
Even statutes imposing penalties other than estoppel from questioning the
valuation of the assessor, have been upheld by some courts. Fox's Appeal,
112 Pa. St. 337. The principal case, however, follows the rule recently
laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is that,
where one acts in good faith, such statutes do not afford due process of
the law within the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127. The prin-
ciples upon which that decision is based, are that the assessment of a tax
is a judicial act, and therefore, before the assessment on omitted property
can be made, notice to the taxpayer, with opportunity to be heard some-
where in the process is essential. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97;
Security Trust & Safety VaultCo. v. City of Lexington, 203 U. S. 323.
DEEDs-DELIVERY-NECESSITY.-FORTUNE V. HUNT, 63 S. E. (N. C.)
82.-Where the grantor gave the deed to a third person with a direction
to take and keep it, and, if the grantor never called for it, to deliver it to
the grantee, and the grantor died without more being done, held, that
there was no delivery of the deed and that the intention of the grantor
that the instrument should be good as a deed would not take the place
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of delivery, and make it operative. Delivery is to a large extent, a ques-
tion of intention. Crain v. Wright, 114 N. Y. 3o7. If the grantor intended
to divest himself of the title the delivery is good. Miller v. Lulman, 8i
Mo. 311. But delivery of a deed to be valid must be such as deprives the
grantor of all control of the instrument. Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn.
568. Accordingly, it is generally held that regardless of intention, there
is no delivery when a deed is given to a third party. to deliver to the
grantee unless called for by the grantor in the meantime. Harman v.
Harman, 7o Fed. 894. Further, since delivery is the act of the grantor
by which he expresses his intention to divest himself of title, it must be
made during his life. Richardson v. Woodstock Iron Co., go Ala. 266.
DEEDS-EXEcUTION IN BLANK-INSERTIONS OF NAME AFTER DELIVERY.
-EsTEIN v. HOLLADAY-KLoTZ LAND AND LUMBER Co., ii S. W. 859
(Mo.) .- Held, that the delivery of the deed with the name of the grantee
left blank, with parol authority to the purchaser to fill in the blank, passes
title to the land, even though the name of the subsequent grantee is in-
serted after delivery.
The general rule is that a deed for land is invalid when it is acknowl-
edged and delivered without the name of the grantee appearing therein.
Whitaker v. Miller, 83 Ill. 381. But the grantor may authorize some one
by parol to fill in the grantee's name before delivery. Cribben v. Deal, 23
Or. 211; Devlin on Deeds, Sect. 456. And some jurisdictions require this
authority to be in writing. Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85. In either case
when not inserted before delivery, the deed passes no interest. Allen v.
Withrow, IIO U. S. I19. Analogous to the case at hand, one jurisdiction
held, that if a party delivers a deed duly executed with parol authority to
fill blanks, he is estopped from denying its validity against a subsequent
purchaser for value without notice. Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex. 379.
DIscOvERY-PHYsIcAL EXAMINATION-POWER OF COURT.-LARsON V.
SALT LAKE CITY ET AL., 97 PAC. 483 (UTAH).-Hcld, that in the absence
of a statute authorizing it, a court of law has no power to compel one
suing for a personal injury to submit to a physical examination by a
physician appointed by the court.
The decisions are not uniform, but there is a weight of authority in
favor of the power of the trial courts to issue such an order, under
proper restrictions. Graves v. Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266; Miami & Mont-
gomery Turnpike Co. v. BailS, 37 Ohio St. 1O4. Some of the foremost
tribunals in this country, however, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, have held that the court has no such inherent power, and
in the absence of statutes cannot compel a physical examination. Camden
& Suburban R. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172; McQuigan v. D., L. & Wfl.
R. Co., 129 N. Y. 5o; Stack v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 177 Mass. 155.
Even where the power is asserted, no one has an absolute right to have
it exercised, but it lies in the discretion of the court. O'Brien v. La Crosse,
99 Wis. 421. Statutes now exist in several of the states, conferring this
power upon the trial courts. McGovern v. Hope, 63 N. J. L. 76; Lyon v.
Manhattan R. Co., 142 N. Y. 298.
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DIVORCE-ALIMONY-JUDGMENT IN PERSONAM-NON-RESIDENT DEFEND-
ANT.-HoD v. HOOD, 6I S. E., 471 (GA.).-Hed, that a judgment in per-
sonam for temoprary alimony and attorney's fees cannot be lawfully ren-
dered in a divorce suit brought against a non-resident husband, who is
not served with process within this state and does not appear in the case,
but is only constructively served by publication.
A decree for temporary alimony is a judgment in personarn. Rigney v.
Rigney, 127 N. Y. 408. As a general proposition, service of process by
publication in actions in personarn is insufficient, as it creates no personat
liability in the person so served. Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. I. The legisla-
ture may authorize constructive service by the court within its juris-
diction, but has no authority to authorize such notice upon non-residents.
Darcy v. Ketchum et al., ii Howe 165. And a decree rendered against
a non-resident under constructive notice may be held void in a foreign
state as not constituting "due process of law" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Eliot v. McCormick, i44 Mass. 1o.
FRAUDS, STATUTES OF-SALES OF PERSONALITY-CORPORATE STOCK.-
SPRAGUE V. HosIE, iI8 N. W. 497 (MIcH.).-Held, that shares of corporate
stock which have been issued, are "goods" within the Statute of Frauds.
Although shares of stock are personal property, it has been held that
they are not goods within the Statute of Frauds. i Thomp. Corp., Sect.
io68. In England, the weight of authority is that they are not goods.
Humble'v. Michell, ii A. & E. 205; Heseltine v. Siggers, I Exch. 856;
Watson v. Spratley, io Exch. 222. And Georgia follows this *authority.
Rogers v. Burr, io5 Ga. 432. But the United States courts as a whole,
favor the other view. North v. Forest, i5 Conn. 400; Gooch v. Holmes,
41 Me. 523; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467; Fine v. Hornsky, 2 Mo.
App. 61; Ely v. Ormsby, 14 Barb. 570.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-RIGHT OF AcTIor
BY WIFE.-WORKMAN V. WORKMAN, 85 S. E. 997 (IND.).-Held, that a
wife may maintain an action for damages for the malicious alienation of
her husband's affections.
The modern tendency is to hold that the loss of her husband's consor-
tium, gives to the wife a right of action within the meaning of the statutes
enabling her to sue alone for an injury to her person, property or personat
rights. Nolan v. Pearson:, 191 Mass. 283; Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138.
Some decisions hold that also she possesses this right at common law,
even to the extent of suing alone. Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. I. But in other
cases where the right at common law was claimed, the necessity of join-
ing the husband in the action was acknowledged as a disability, which
the statutes have now removed. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584. Some
courts deny altogether the existence of this right of action, either at
common law or under such statutes. Duflies v Duffles, 76 Wis. 374;
Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me. I9o; Hodge v. Wetzlcr, 69 N. J. L. 490.
INSURANCE-AcCIDENT INSURANCE-ACcIDENTAL MEANS.-ScHMIDT V.
INDIANA TRAVELERS' Acc. Ass'N., 85 N. E. 1032.-Where one who carried
accident insurance died of circulatory failure and paralysis of the heart
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brought on by physical exertion in the rarified atmosphere of a mountain
resort, where he had gone for his health, held, that since he died from
doing what he intended to do though the result was not anticipated, his
death was not the result of accidental means, and no recovery could be
had on the accident policy.
An accident is generally defined as an unforseen event which happens
without the design or aid of a person. Williams v. U. S. Mutual Acc.
Ass'n., 38 N. Y. St. Rep. 378. But in order to recover on an accident in-
surance policy, it is not enough that the injury was unforseen and without
design. Reynolds v. Equitable Acc. Ass'n., 49 Hun. (N. Y.) 605. The
means which produced the injury must have been accidental. U. S. Mutual
Acc. Ass'n. v. Barry, 131 U. S. ioo. A person may do certain acts which
may produce what is commonly called an accident, but unless in the acts
which preceded the injury something unexpected or unusual happens, the
means cannot be said to be accidental. Clidero v. Scottish Acc. Ins. Co.,
39 Scot. L. Rep. 303. So where one died from an injury received while
swinging indian clubs, it was held that if the injury resulted from the
use of the clubs in the ordinary way of taking exercise, such injury could
not be attributed to accidental means; but if, as was the case, the injury
was caused by a sudden movement while using the clubs due to an unfor-
seen obstruction, then the means was accidental and a recovery could he
had. McCarthy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (U. S.) 1879, 7 Rep. 486.
JUDGMENTS-CoNcLUSIVENESs-RECORD.-CHILDRESS v. CARLEY ET AL.,
46 So. 164 (Miss.).-Held, that a judicial record, purporting on its face to
be complete as required by law, is in law not the subject of impeach-
ment. Whitfield, C. J., dissenting.
The utmost verity it attached to judgments and they are not the sub-
ject of impeachment, where made by the proper tribunal acting within its
jurisdiction, except by a direct attack by the authority of the state. Kelley
v. Dresser, 93 Mass. 31. A judicial record cannot be affected by parol.
Kendatl v. Powers, 4 Metc. 553. The record, showing nothing irregular
on its face, will be conclusively presumed to be correct in case of any
collateral proceedings. Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 444; Stroyer 7'.
Richmond, i6 Ohio St. 455. Mere irregularities in entering the judgment
will not subject it to impeachment; provisions for filing-and entering a
judgment roll being looked upon as merely directory and not imperative.
Bennett v. Couchman, 48 Barb. 73.
MASTER AND SERVANT-DUTIES DISTINGUISHED-NEGLIGENT DEPARTURE
FROM REASONABLY SAFE METHOD OF WORK.-PORTLAND GOLD MINING CO. v.
DucE, 164 FED. i8o.-Held, that as between master and servant, the duty
of using a reasonably safe place, of so operating reasonably safe machinery.
and of so conforming to an established and reasonably safe method of
work, that injury will not be inflicted negligently is the duty of those to
whom the work is intrusted and is no part of the positive duty of the
master.
All that can be required of a master is that he use reasonable care to
avoid exposing his servant to extraordinary risk. Wonder v. B. & 0. R. Co.,
32 Md. 411. The duty of using a reasonably safe place and so operating
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a reasonably safe machine, that neither the place nor the machine shall be
dangerous by their negligent use or operation, is the duty of the servant to
whom the operation is intrusted not that of the master. American Bridge
Co. v. Leeds, i44 Fed. 6o5; Eichcle v. St. Paul Furniture Co., 40 Minn. 263.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT---"'FELLOW SERVANT.-
LATSHA V. SHAMOKIN & E. ELECTRIc Ry. Co., 7o ATL. 1002 (PA.).-Held,
that the superintendent of an electric railway company taking out a car to
test it, acting as a motorman, is not a fellow servant of a motorman injured
by the negligence of the superintendent while so operating the car.
It is the duty of a master to exercise such care in the conduct of his
business as will render it reasonably safe to his servants. Baltimore, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Henthorne, 73 Fed. 634. It is well settled that the master may
delegate the performance of this duty to a vice-principal, and when this is
shown, the master will be bound by the acts of the vice-principal the same
as though he had undertaken the performance of the duty in person. Tyson
v. South, etc., Alabama Ry. Co., 6i Ala. 5s4. But the same person may
under different circumstances be a fellow-servant; the test is not one of
grade but whether the employee was engaged in the performance of the
duty imposed by law upon the master, when the injury complained of
occurred. Conley v. City of Portland, 78 Me., 217; Stockmeyer v. Reed,
55 Fed. 259.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANTS.-
GEORGIA COAL & IRON Co. v. BRADFORD, 62 S. E. 193 (GA.).-A teamster
employed by a coal and iron company, to assist in hauling a boiler from
the furnace plant of the company to its coal mines, was struck by a loco-
motive operated in connection 'with the plant. Held, that he was a fellow
servant with the engineer and fireman of the locomotive, all being employes
of a common master, engaged in labor for the furtherance of the general
purpose of the business.
The principal case applies the strict rule to be found in the Massachu-
setts decisions, that the relation of fellow servant is not confined to two
servants working in company and having the opportunity to control and
influence the conduct of each other, but extends to every case in which,
deriving their authority and compensation from the same source, they
are engaged in the same business, though in different departments. Hol-
den z'. Fitchburg R. Co., 129 Mass. 268. Some courts, however, give a
more liberal construction to this doctrine, holding that if the departments
of the two servants are so far separated that the possibility of the two ser-
vants coming in contact, while performing their usual duties, could not be
said to be within the contemplation of the person injured, the master will
not be exempt from liability. N. Pac. R. Co. v. Hambly, i54 U. S. 349;
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Morando, 93 Ill. 302. In many states what is
qnown as the "department" rule prevails, and servants engaged in different
departments of the same business are not regarded as fellow servants.
Sulliva1i v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. 97 Mo. io3; Kielley v. Belcher S. M. Co.,
3 Sawyer 437.
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NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-TAKING MANIFEST RISK TO
SAVE PROPERTY.-THOMPSON V. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY., 62 S. E. 396
(S. C.).-Held, that it is not contributory negligence per se for one whose
property is endangered to take a manifest risk to save it, unless the risk
was wanton and unreasonable.
A person may attempt to save his property which is threatened or im-
periled. Liming v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 8I Iowa 246; Hall v. Huber, 6i Mo.
App. 384. But the weight of authority is that one cannot take an obvious
risk which is likely to result in serious injury without being guilty of
such negligence as will preclude a recovery for personal damages sustained
in so doing. Morris v. Ry Co., 148 N. Y. 182; Cook v. Johnson, 58
Mich. 437. The taking of a moderate degree of personal risk, however,
even in the face of obvious danger, would probably not be regarded as a
fault in some circumstances. Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, § 85.
The test generally is whether a reasonably prudent man would have acted
in like manner. Rexter v. Starin, 73 N. Y. 6O1; Pegram v. Searboard Air
Line Ry., 139 N. C. 303.
RAILROADS-JOINT USE OF TRACKS-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES FROM
NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF TRAINs.-HANBLE v. ATCHISON, T. & SF. E. Ry.
Co., 164 FED. 4.-Held, that where the trains of one railroad company in
charge of its own employes run over the tracks of another company under
a contract that they shall obey the orders of the train dispatcher of the
latter company, such contract does not relieve the company so using the
tracks from liability for injuries caused to third person§ by the negligence
of its employes operating its trains in no way attributable to any order of
the train dispatcher.
Atwood v. Chi., R. I. & Pac., 72 Fed. 447, held, that where the de-
fendant company has no right or power to direct the movement of its
trains over the tracks of the other company it could not be held respon-
sible to third parties on the doctrine of respondcat superior, for any negli-
gence of the men in charge of train, even though they were their own em-
ployes. Clark v. Geer, 86 Fed. 447, however, holds that where trains of
one company in charge of its own employes run over the tracks of another
company under contract, that they shall obey the orders of the train dis-
patcher of the latter company, such contract does not relieve the company
so using the tracks from liability for negligence of its own employes. Chi.,
R. I. & Pac. v. Greves, 56 Kan. 6oi.
SUICIDE-AIDING.-SAuNDERS V. STATE, 112 S. W. 68 (TEx.).-Held,
that one who furnishes another the means for committing suicide, know-
ing that he intends to kill himself, is not guilty of a crime.
At common law, one who assisted another to kill himself was guilty of
murder. 4 BI. Com. i8g. But owing to the technical rule, that the principal
must first be tried and convicted, he escaped punishment. Rex. v. Russell,
z Moody C. C. 356. In many jurisdictions in this country, one who, with
knowledge, assists another to commit suicide, is guilty of murder as a prin-
cipal. Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356. Even furnishing poison to
another, knowing that he intends to commit suicide, is regarded as a mode
of administering it. Blackburn v. State. 23 Ohio St. 146. Where this crime
YALE LAW JOURNAL
is regulated by statute, it has been held that every person who deliberately
assists another in the commission of self-murder, is guilty of manslaughter
in the first degree. State v. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412.
TAXATION-SITUS FOR TAXATION-DEBTS DUE NON-RESIDENTS.-LIvER-
POOL & LONDON & GLOBE INS. Co. v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS ET AL., 47 SO.
415 (LA.).-Held, that debts due on open account to a non-resident are
taxable at the domicile of the debtor when they have arisen out of business
carried on in the taxing state and form part of the capital of the business.
Breaux, C. J., and Monroe, J., dissenting.
I As a general rule, the situs of personal property for taxation is
determiend by application of the maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam.
Barber v. Farr, 54 Ia. 57. A legal fiction, however, is to be
resorted to only when convenience and justice so require. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 2o5 U. S. 398. And the
situs of the evidence of a debt is immaterial in determining the situs
of a debt. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, ioo U. S. 491; except that general usage
makes some evidence acquire the character of property which is taxable
where found. State Tax on Foreign Bonds, i5 Wall. 3oo. The fact that
the law of the place where the debtor is will make him pay, only gives
the debt validity. Adams v. Batchelder, 173 Mass. 258. Protection of the
law and taxation are reciprocal. i Cooley on Taxation, 22. The state
may tax all property over which it has jurisdiction, regardless of whether
the owner is a resident within the state. Johnson v. Bradley, Watkins Tie
Co., 27 Ky. Law, 54o. That two states should tax, the same property on
different and more or less inconsistent principles, infringes no rule of
Constitutional law. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-DAMAGES FOR MENTAL ANGUISH-
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES.-LEE v. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co.,
X13 S. W. 5 (Ky.).-Held, that damages for mental anguish, caused by
the failure of a telephone company to deliver a message, announcing death
or sickness could not be recovered unless the relationship between the
parties was that of parent and child, husband and wife, sister and brother,
or grandparent and grandchild.
The general rule of law is that damages for mental anguish alone can-
not be recovered. Blount v. Western Union Tel. Co., 126 Ala. IO5; Sum-
merfield v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Wis. I. But in those jurisdictions
that allow recovery for mental anguish alone, the relation between the
parties is usually one of those mentioned in the case at hand. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Cline, 8 Ind. App. 364. And, if not, notice must be given
that a failure to deliver promptly would cause mental anguish. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. McMillan and ux., 30 S. W. 298 (Tex.). Even notice
was not required in one jurisdiction, and a wife was allowed to recover
damages for mental anguish, caused by failure to deliver a message,
announcing the death of her husbaid, and the consequent failure of his
uncle to be present with her at the funeral. Bright v. Tel. Co., 132 N. C.
317. And it was held that damages for mental anguish were not limited
to instances where the message related to sickness and death. Green v.
Tel. Co., 136 N. C. 489. But the tendency seems to be to limit a recovery
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for mental anguish to cases where the parties are closely related by blood.
Wadsworth v. Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695.
THEATRES AND SHOWS-IMPLIED CONTRACTS AS TO SAFETY.-SCOTT V.
UNIVERSITY OF MIcH. ATHLETIC AsS'N., ii6 N. W. 624 (MIc.).-Hcld,
that an athletic association owning a spectators' stand which had been
erected by a competent builder, and before use was pronounced safe by
engineers, did not, as a matter of law, exercise reasonable care to prevent
injury to a spectator, caused by collapse of the stand.
The general rule is that the owner of a public resort contracts to
exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition. Brother-
ton v. Manhattan Beach Imp. Co., 48 Neb. 564. In the application of this
rule some interesting results have been developed; for example, it has
been held that the owner of a grandstand was chargeable with negligence
because he had failed during three years to have the structure examined by
a competent builder and architect. Fox v. Buffalo Park, 47 N. Y. Supp.
788. And in an action against the proprietor of a theatre, it was held that
reasonable care had been exercised in construction, although the floor of
the gallery was given a pitch of 55 degrees, and the railing was only
three feet high. Dunning v. Jacobs, 36 N. Y. Supp. 453. But in England,
it was said that the owner of a stand did not simply contract to use rea-
sonable care to keep the stand safe, but impliedly warranted that due care
has been exercised in constructing the stand. Francis v. Cochrell, 5 L. R.
Q. B. 184.
